This paper considers a firm that may issue common stock or debt to undertake an investment opportunity when the investors and the manager have different estimates of the expected return from the investment.
INTRODUCTION
posited that in an ideal world the value of a firm depends only on its profitability, not on the debt-equity mix, so that the choice between debt and equity is irrelevant. This issue initiated a flood of work analyzing this choice in a world of imperfect and incomplete capital markets. Jensen and Meckling (1976) has concentrated on agency costs as a determinant of corporate financing choice, and argued that the firm should issue debt in order to avoid the incentive dilution. Ross (1977) argued that the firm will not issue 100% with debt because of high bankruptcy costs, and the optimal amount of debt-equity finance occurs when the costs associated with incentive dilution are equal to the costs associated with increased risk. Myers and Majluf (1984) analyzed the financing decision by firms according to the "pecking order" hypothesis because of issues relating to control and disclosure. A key assumption of the above modern corporate financing decision is homothetic expectation. The investor and manager are assumed to have identical estimates of the expected return from the investment.
However, Miller (1977) argued that it is implausible to assume identical estimate although the future is very uncertain and that men may differ in their forecasts what Miller called divergence of opinion or heterogeneous belief.
After Miller (1977) , the heterogeneous belief is explored by many scholars. Kreps (1990) argues that heterogeneous priors are a more general specification than homogeneous priors. Kurz (1994) provides the foundations for heterogeneous but rational priors. Harris and Raviv (1993) use differences of opinion to explain empirical regularities about the relation between stock price and volume. Kandel and Pearson (1995) make the case that their evidence of trading volume around public information announcements can be best understood within a framework in which agents interpret the same information differently. Barberis and Thaler (2002) note that a key ingredient of behavioral models that provide explanations for asset pricing anomalies is disagreement among market participants. Garmaise (2001) examines the implications of heterogeneous beliefs for security design. Coval and Thakor (2005) show that heterogeneous priors can give rise to financial intermediation. But the heterogeneous belief is considered less in corporate financing decision. Allen and Gale (1999) examine how heterogeneous priors affect new firm financing. Boot, Gopalan and Thakor (2006) use heterogeneous priors to develop a theory of "managerial autonomy" that characterizes the allocation of control rights among financiers and its capital structure implications. Dittmar and Thakor (2007) predicts that managers use equity to finance projects when they believe that investors' views about project payoffs are likely to be aligned with theirs. This paper develops a model and presents a new prediction to reveal the impact of investor-manager heterogeneous beliefs on corporate financing decision, and tests the prediction using the data in Chinese financial market. The rest of the paper is organized as follow: Section 2 develops the model and puts forwards a testable hypothesis. Section 3 describes sample selection procedure, and Section 4 discusses the empirical result. Section 5 concludes.
MODEL AND PREDICTION

Events and Time Line of Corporate Financing decision
A model is developed briefly and the prediction is presented in this section. There are three points in time. The investors and the manager are risk-neutral, the financial market is perfectly competitive, and the risk-less rate and the debt rate are all zero. 
The Predicted and Real Payoff of the Manager and the Investors
If equity is issued then the manager predict that the initial shareholder's equity value is 0 ( )(
) 
)
issued then the manager predict that the initial shareholder's equity value is 0
(1 ) 
Corporate Financing Decision under Heterogeneous Beliefs
When the following conditions are met the manager will issue equity.
(1) 
When the following conditions are met the manager will issue debt. 
When the following conditions are met the manager will desert the investment. 
The above results can be expressed as Figure 2 , Where district ① means equity issue, district ② means debt issue and district ③ means the manager will desert investment. 
Testable Prediction
From the conditions (4)(5), we know that only the investor's predicted value is high enough can the manager choose to issue equity. The condition (6) shows that when the manager's predicted value is high enough the firm will issue debt. The condition (7) shows that when the manager's and the investor's predicted values are all low the firm will desert the investment. So we have the following prediction:
Prediction: The higher the difference between the investor's and the manager's predicted value, the more likely a firm tends to issue equity.
EMPIRICAL METHOD
Sample Selection and Source of Data Description of Variable
We 
Description of Variable
(1) Dependent Variable (TAPE ) We use the discrete dependent variable TAPE to describe manager's issuance decision and assume that TAPE equals 1 for an equity issuance and equals 0 for a debt issuance. (2006), we use the difference between the analysts earnings forecasts and the announced earnings by the firm at the fiscal year of the issue to proxy the degree of heterogeneous beliefs between the manager and investors.
(3) Control Variable The other independent variables are described in table 2. All control variables are measured at the end of the year prior to the issue. 
Methodology
We use Probit regression to test the theoretical prediction due to the dummy independent variable. The regression can be expressed as the following equation (8), where individual firms are index i and year t , and ) (⋅ F is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal variable. All the data are disposed using the soft of eviews6.0 and excel2003. Table 3 presents a series of Probit regression results employing independent variables, such as heterogeneous beliefs between the manager and investors, log of total asserts, ratio of exchangetraded shares to total shares, ratio of return to net assets, ratio of institutional shares to total shares, ratio of tangible assets to total asserts and the ratio of debt to assets minus the median in its industry, which may have impact on financing decision in prior literature.
EMPIRICAL RESULT
In terms of coefficient and significance of variable, the coefficient of key variable IMHB is positive and significant at % 1 or 5% level in all equations, which indicate that the higher the heterogeneity of beliefs between the investors and the manager, the more likely a firm is to issue equity. The result empirically supports our prediction and is consistent with Dittmar and Thakor(2007) Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively.
observe that 2 R McF is increasing in the number of variables, reaching its peak of 0.160, which supports that every control variable has incremental explanatory power over corporate financing decision.
CONCLUSIONS
We present a model to investigate the relation between corporate financing decision and the heterogeneity of beliefs between the investors and the manager. The model generates a new prediction and we test it. Firstly, different values of the initial shareholder and investors under the issues of equity, debt and no financing are analyzed. Secondly, the conditions on the issue of equity, debt and no financing are confirmed respectively. Thirdly, the prediction is presented based on the above two conclusions. In the end, we empirically analyze the impact of heterogeneity beliefs on security issuance decision using a sample of issues from Chinese financial market, and we find that heterogeneity beliefs have explanatory power to security issuance decision.
